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American Legal Theory and American Legal Education: A Snake 
Swallowing its Tail? 
By John Henry Schlegel 
My story is a story about American Legal Realism. It is part of an attempt to understand 
what Realism was by addressing the question, "Why is the study of Realism a subject of 
legal history and not of current events?" Of course, the "answer" to such a question is 
made up of several partial answers, of which what follows is but one. Others would talk 
about the relationship between legal doctrine and capitalist economic development or 
about legal theory and political philosophy or about legal theory and legal practice, to 
name a few examples. However, this partial answer can best be approached by examining 
how a simple idea about law - the liberal idea of the rule of law in its guise as the "rule 
theory of law" - has had in its rise and in its demise an impact on legal education and to 
attempt to understand why that is so. My attempt however, requires that I start my story 
back aways with Christopher Columbus Langdell and the Harvard Law School. 
A. The Classical Order 1870-1920 
Langdell is one of the more obvious enigmas of legal intellectual history. Tony Chase 2 and 
Tom Grey to the contrary notwithstanding, Grant Gilmore was right. Langdell was gentle, 
essentially stupid man who clung onto a simple idea with all the tenacity that only the 
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. B.A., Northwestern University, 1964; J.D., University of 
Chicago, 1967. Author: From the Yale Experience, 28 Buffalo Law Review 459 (1979); American Legal Realism and 
Empirical Social Science, The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 Buffalo Law Review 195 (1980); Notes Toward 
and Intimate, Affectionate and Opinionated History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 Stanford Law 
Review 391 (1984); Langdell's Legacy: or the Case of the Empty Envelope, 36 Stanford Law Review 1517 (1984). 
American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science (1995); Of Duncan, Peter and Thomas Kuhn, 22 Cardozo Law 
Review 1061 (2001); But Pierre, If We Can't Think Normatively, What are We to Do? 57 Miami Law Review 955 
(2003); CLS Wasn't Killed By a Question, 58 Alabama Law Review 967(2007); Law and Economic Change the Short 
Twentieth Century in 3 Cambridge History of Law In America 563 (2008); On the Many Flavors of Capitalism, or 
Reflections on Schumpeter's Ghost, 56 Buffalo Law Review 965 (2009). 
1Norbert Reich supplied this elegant substitute for all sorts of awkward phrases. 
2 Anthony Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL 329 (1979); Anthony Chase, Origins ofHIST. 
Modern Professional Education: The Harvard Case Method Conceived as Clinical Instruction in Law, 5 NOVA L.J. 
323 (1981) 
Thomas C.Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U.PITT.L.REV.1 (1983) 
4 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGESOFAMERICAN LAW 42 (1977) 
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stupid can muster. Nor can Langdell's revolution be saved by attaching it to Harvard's 
president, Charles Eliot. 5 Eliot may have known something about scientific education, 
including medical education, but he could have known nothing about legal education if he 
believed that studying cases was a clinical education or that a law library was a laboratory. 
And yet, Langdell and Eliot intuitively understood something that few others did in the 
years after the Civil War. They understood one way, at least, of fitting legal education to 
what would be, with their help of course, the dominant legal theory of the time. 
Robert Gordon6, Tom Grey and Duncan Kennedy8 each have attempted to isolate this 
dominant late-nineteenth century legal theory that Gordon calls liberal legal science. I 
have nothing against these versions; I nevertheless find a later version of the theory, that 
of Joseph Beale in the mid-twentieth century, like Bach's belated exemplification of the 
baroque, clearer for my purposes. In his great treatise on the conflict of laws, Beale argued 
that law was made up of three things: principles, "the largest portion even of the particular 
law of a state", standards and rules, some of which are "quite arbitrary in their 
operation".9 These three things, however, are not generally arbitrary; rather, they "tend to 
form a single homogeneous philosophical system".10 "Changes made by legislation and by 
wrong decisions", by the arbitrary pieces of the law which are respectively "small" and 
"uncommon", "constitute the greater part of the peculiar local law of any jurisdiction, as 
distinguished from the doctrine of the prevailing legal system". 1It is this prevailing legal 
system, "the common law", "general bodies of principle [which] exist and are capable of 
scientific development", that is the subject of study in "any law school of more than local 
importance". 12 Due to the great proliferation of decisions, "[m]ore and more the 
development of the law by decisions has been complimented by a development of the law 
through the study and experience of scholars".13 This general system, which "exists apart 
from positive law", and thus "neither by legislation nor by judicial legislation can be 
Which Tony Chase has clearly tried to do in his work. 
6 Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS 
AND PROFESSIONALIDEOLOGIESINAMERICA, 70 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983) 
See, supra, note 3. 
8 Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal 
Thought inAmerica, 1850-1940, in RESEARCHIN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY3 (Stephen Spitzer ed., 1980) 
JOSEPHH. BEALE,A TREATISEON THECONFLICTOF LAWS 2 (1935) 
10Id., 23. 
11Id., 25. 
12 Id., 27-28. 
13 Id., 28. 
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changed", is in force because it isaccepted as in force.14 Yet, it is certain that the common 
law changes; "[T]his must be true, or the science of law, differing from all other sciences, 
would be unprogressive".15 Change in the law comes from "change of the professional 
opinion about it", a professional opinion that is molded by the judges and by the law 
teachers and other "legal thinkers who are not judges".16 But no matter what changes are 
made in law, a legal system must have certain characteristics. It must be general, "since 
justice requires equality of treatment for all persons, and this means generality"; universal, 
since "it is unthinkable in a civilized country that any act should fall outside of the domain 
of law"; continuous, since "society needs to know the law in advance of judicial action 
upon it"; just, since "it is impossible at every moment to depend upon brute force for the 
administration and enforcement of law"; and predictable, since "the principle function of 
law is the prevention of disputes" by giving advice to "clients as to the quality of 
contemplated acts".'7 
As a description of the American legal system in operation in 1935 when this was written, 
Beale's construction is fantabulous and yet it is a remarkable piece of work for the way 
that it fits into the ideology of the larger society and into Langdell's law school. Let me back 
into the matter of the relationship between the rule theory of law as a form of liberal legal 
science and the ideology of the larger society by looking more carefully at Langdell. 
Although Tony Chase seems to have decided that Eliot was the dominant force,'8 it is 
Langdell who interests me more. Reading Langdell's annual reports in an eye-opener. The 
man was a numerologist, a sort of primitive version of Holmes' man of statistics, if not 
economics. Langdell's peculiar, very sensitive seismograph charted and attempted to 
explain the most minute variations in enrollment, tuition receipts, library acquisitions and 
the like.'9 Indeed, while it is asserted that he spoke so little because of his faith in his 
system,20 the truth isthat he spoke much, though very little about legal education and that 
14 Id., 30. 
15 Id., 39. 
16 Id., 40. 
17Id., 45-48. 
18 Origins of Modern Professional Education (note 2). But cf. Anthony Chase, Lawyer Training in the Age of the 
Department Store, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 893, 906-08 (1983). 
1 See, e.g., Langdell, Annual Report on the Law School, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTANDTREASUREROFHARVARD 
COLLEGE1883-84, 100-107; Langdell, Annual Report on the Law School, in ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE PRESIDENTAND 
TREASURER OF HARVARD COLLEGE1884-85, 112-16; Langdell, Annual Report on the Law School, IN ANNUAL REPORTSOF 
THE PRESIDENTAND TREASUREROFHARVARD COLLEGE1887-88, 92-105. 
20 Eugene Wambaugh, Professor Langdell-A View of His Career, 20 HARV. L.REV. 1(1906) 
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much of what he said about legal education was absolutely inconsequential.21 Indeed, I 
seriously doubt that Langdell really understood anything about the revolution that was 
brought about in his name, except that he had fathered a new subspecies of lawyer - the 
full-time academic.22 That is,unless, one assumes that the old man really believed that law 
was a system of rules to be applied to concrete cases. 
I confess that I have always had a hard time deciding what I think that Langdell, and here I 
use him as an eponym for an entire generation of elite lawyers, believed. Surely, this 
generation talked as if law was a system of rules - they spent enough time looking for the 
historical origins of these rules and trying to come to a "true" understanding of them. And 
yet it was simultaneously clear that the rules were really not the important elements in the 
Langdellian system, much less the cases, the supposed lynchpin of the case method. It was 
the principles that animated the system, that tested the rules and the cases.23 The law was 
thus better described as asystem of principles than a system of rules. 
I doubt that Langdell managed to fool himself and others about the lack of difference 
between a system of rules and a system of principles. For me the then common distinction 
between arguing a case on principle and arguing it on precedent demonstrates that others 
understood the difference. And yet, and yet what? And yet at times Langdell and others 
talked as if they did not know the difference. Perhaps such is what ideologies are made of, 
things one knows but does not know, and yet seeing law, and especially theories about 
law, as ideology has its problems. Who is listening? Ideologies imply the presence of 
auditors and if the ideology is for other lawyers and elite friends, somehow the effort 
seems wasted. Law as an elaborate mental teddy bear, as bed time stories for lazy lawyers, 
strikes me, quite simply, as implausible. 
Langdell wrote about 200 In addition he penned the famous CHRISTOPHERpages of annual reports. COLUMBUS 
LANGDELL,PREFACE OFCASES VII(1871); Christopher Columbus Langdell, TheTo A SELECTION ONTHELAW OFCONTRACTS 
Harvard Law School, 1869-1894, 2 HARV. GRAD. MAG. 490 (1894); Speech at 250th Anniversary Dinner, 3 L.Quar. 
Rev. 123 (1887); and Speech at the 25th Anniversary of Christopher Columbus Langdell as Dean of Harvard Law 
School, 29 AM. L. REV. 605 (1895). Out of this only the Preface; the 250th Anniversary Dinner containing the 
famous passages on legal science, portions of the reports of 1873-74 (importance of division into classes, library 
as laboratory), 1976-77 (admission to bar in New York, division of bar into attorneys and counsellors) and 1886-87 
(importance of a thorough professional education in the science of law, necessity for scholarships to encourage 
such study); and the Deanship anniversary dinner (listing accomplishments) can even vaguely be said to have 
anything to do with legal education. Of this, only the brief passages on legal science, which are hopelessly 
confused can be said to be other than decanal clap trap. 
22 The Harvard Law School 1869-1894 (note 21), 479-98 
23 Robert Gordon was the first person to point this out to me. A good illustration is found in the story about 
Langdell's equity course where he found Lumley v. Wagner to be simply wrong. See, Joseph H. Beale, Professor 
Langdell - His later Teaching Days, 20 HARV. L. REV. 9, 10 (1906), and in the oft quoted statement, "The vast 
majority [of cases] are useless, and worse than useless, for any purpose of systematic study". PREFACETo A 
SELECTIONOFCASESON THELAW OFCONTRACTS(note 21), viii. 
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Still the question of audience is important. Concededly, the rule of law is an ideology, a 
shared understanding about political order, that, like all such understandings, makes some 
things acceptable and others not. But this ideology, in its guise of the rule of theory of law, 
cannot plausibly be described as being directed by the lawyers out into the community. 
Rather it is deep within the community down to the level of older sisters bossing younger 
brothers by telling them to "buckle up" because "its the law" or telling their fathers to 
"slow down", speeding is "against the law". But in this guise, the rule theory of law is for 
lawyers a rather simpleminded thing, implausible as a serious explanation of their work. 
Yet it cannot be wholly ignored. To the extent that an ideological justification of a lawyer's 
own activities is necessary, it is, if not essential, at least desirable, that the adopted 
justification, the explanation of the self to the self, fit tolerably well within the larger 
ideology of the community. It is this tension between the ideology of the larger community 
and the construction of a narrower justification of the lawyer's work that gives Langdell's 
ideas and all of late nineteenth century legal thought its peculiar half in, half out of focus 
quality, the sense of comfortably saying contradictory things one after another. For law 
can't both be the application of rules derived from cases and the application of principles 
that prove some of the cases to be wrong. Nevertheless, if the dominant ideology sees law 
as the application of pre-existing rules by judges in an even-handed way, the Langdellian 
theory is not a bad attempt to fit the reality of chaotic often contradictory decisions of not 
always beyond reproach judicial officers into the ideology. The notion of law as a body of 
principles somehow both abstracted from, and independent of, actual decisions, which 
principles are elaborated by an identifiable "method" and applied by the judges usually, 
but not invariably, correctly, may be a brooding omnipresence, but it both preserves law 
application and recognizes actual diversity. Moreover, at the more abstract level of 
political theory this notion "solves" questions about the justifiability of the decisions of an 
unelected judiciary - of their acceptability within a democratic political system, their 
freedom from the taint of personal or group interest - by combining authoritative 
premises for decision with a determinative technique of decision. Legal science as method, 
"the extraction of general principles by means of historical study [of cases] and the 
arrangement of them in rational relation to one another", 2 4 provided both the premises 
and the technique. The process of abstraction of principles from the particulars of cases 
yielded the premises with, of course, the intervention of a purifying lens (acombination of 
a critical theory of history, the appeal of examples from comparable institutions and the 
natural reason of the well educated lawyer)25 to free principle from the "warping by bad 
precedent", and then was mirrored in the process of application of principles so purified to 
cases. Together the two were the process of legal reasoning, the technique that yielded 
the rule of law. 
24 See, supra, note 6, 87. 
25 Id., 84, 88. 
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This model parallels the substantive side of Langdell's law school. The pure private law 
curriculum that he designed was supposed to allow the student to derive the applicable 
legal principle from a multitude of narrowly relevant cases, often arranged in historical 
order and to apply the principles thus derived in the newly instituted course exams and the 
more ancient moot courts2.26 It was thus a curriculum cleansed both of inhibiting local 
legislation and of warping precedent. Of the rest of the Langdellian reforms, the most 
notable, the Socratic dialog, harkened back to the catechistical recitation sessions of the 
New England colleges. It was hardly important to Langdell, who abandoned it as his 
eyesight failed, 27 but may have been a serious educational innovation in law for it moved 
the question of justification more to the center of the student-teacher relationship.28 The 
longer, three year curriculum and the required college degree are part of the other 
conscious innovation that Langdell made the development of the new sub-pieces in the 
profession, the full-time law teacher.29 The old man considered it one of his great 
innovations30 and it surely was for it was the full-time academics on both sides of the 
Atlantic 31 who put together the treatises and in the United States, the casebooks, an 
innovation designed to limit the wear and tear on the library,3 2 that entombed the 
substantive program of legal science. However, the relationship of these scholars to 
Langdellian legal theory and thus to the rule theory of law takes a while to explain. 
The reference to law teachers which sticks out somewhat uncomfortably in Beale's 
argument is,of course, a clue to the fact that Langdell could not have brought forth "his" 
revolution by himself. He needed and received the assistance from over one hundred 
young, and few not so young, teachers of law throughout the land each of whom brought 
the case method to his school in the ten years on either side of the turn of the century.33 
Creating this corps of fulltime teachers of law to replace the part-time practitioner-
teachers who had populated American law schools in the years before 1910 was Langdell's 
most significant achievement and one he recognized long before it was clear that this 
26 ROBERT LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL INAMERICA FROM THE 1850'STO THE1980's (1983), 35-42, 51-57STEVENS, EDUCATION 
27THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 1817-1917 (1918), 36 
28 Al Katz pointed this out to me years ago. 
29 See, supra, note 26, 38, 60-61. 
3o See, supra, note 22. 
31 As David Sugarman has now made crystal clear. David Sugarman, Legal Theory, The Common Law Mind and The 
Making of the Text Book Tradition, in LEGALTHEORY ANDCOMMON LAW 26 (William Twining ed., 1986). 
32 See, Christopher Columbus Langdell, Annual Report on the Law School, in ANNUAL REPORTS PRESIDENTOF THE A D 
TREASURER 1890-91, 104, 116.OFHARVARD COLLEGE 
See, John Henry Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the American Legal Realists: The 
Professionalization of the American Law Professor, 35 J. LEGAL ED.311 (1985). 
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change would carry the day.34 However, the growth of Midwestern and western states 
brought with it the establishment of public universities throughout the land, each of which, 
in emulation of Michigan, expressed the need to have a state law school. These schools 
and a few of the larger, private universities, were the ones who most quickly adopted the 
case system of legal education, largely as they aped elite status and hired graduates of 
Harvard, Columbia and Chicago who had studied under that system. 
Elsewhere, of course, legal education, particularly private legal education unaffiliated or 
quite loosely affiliated with a university, was growing like crazy as well.35 Indeed, 
proportionately, this segment of legal education was growing more rapidly than the state 
schools and the more elite private schools that had also followed Langdell's lead. The great 
increase in urban population, due in part to immigration from Europe, was accompanied 
by a great increase in the demand for legal education, particularly part-time, night school 
legal education. Teaching in most of these schools was pure, indeed occasionally stridently 
pure, pre-Langdell text and lecture and the schools personned largely by part-time 
practitioner-teachers. 36 The course of study at these schools was often the same length as, 
and thus effectively shorter than, the course for full-time day students at the more elite 
schools and the cost, once the opportunity costs of foregone income are considered, thus 
less than, or at most equal to, the cost of a legal education at even a public law school. The 
economic threat to the elite schools with full-time faculty, and to practitioners generally, 
from cheap ways of entering the profession was thus quite real. 
Not surprisingly, the bar and the elite schools attempted to choke off the avenues of cheap 
access to the profession, though for different reasons.37 The bar, of course, was interested 
in price fixing; it wished to raise, or at least maintain, price by decreasing supply. The role 
of the law professors was more complex. They too wished to protect their market; a world 
full of cut rate versions of their law schools made it difficult to justify their relatively 
privileged position. So uniting with the bar to require that each and every law student have 
a college degree and spend three full-time years, or their equivalent, in law school, the 
obvious "standard" both groups strived for, was in the interest of the academics and yet 
34 The issue was still a live one as late as 1910. Langdell's strongest statements came fifteen years earlier. See, 
supra, note 22. 
See, supra, note 26, in the source of most of this paragraph. 
See, e.g., Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, The Challenge to Hierarchy in Legal Education: Suffolk and the 
Night Law School Movement, in RESEARCH AND SOCIALIN LAW, DEVIANCE CONTROL,189 (1985). 
What follows is a summary of the argument in Schlegel, supra, note 33. That in turn draws heavily on MAGALI 
LARSON,THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM(1977) and JEROLDAUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:LAWYERSAND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
MODERN AMERICAN (1976). I have also wrestled with this problem inJohn Henry Schlegel, Langdell's Legacy, or the 
Case of the Empty Envelope, 36 STANFORD LAW REVIEW(Stan. L. Rev.) 1517 (1984). Iconfess that I suspect that my 
friends in C.L.S. may well find this argument to be too functionalist and for this reason have chosen to ignore it. 
On this question see, infra, note 39. 
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this is only part of the story. Price fixing only works for standardized products, like No. 2 
bituminous coal or Saudi Arabian Light Crude Oil. But, given that legal jobs and legal skills 
are anything but uniform, many different kinds or types of legal education might have 
been appropriate for law students, depending on the type of practice each wanted to 
enter. Thus, unless one wishes to settle for a part of the entire market, as Langdell may 
have initially wished to do,3 in order to gain control of a market in law knowledge one 
"needs" to establish a single legal education assertedly appropriate to the entire market. 
The uniformity of degree requirements went part way toward solving this problem, yet as 
anyone who has observed an undergraduate school will soon notice, a program of uniform 
graduation requirements, such as would have satisfied the practicing lawyers' needs, 
standing alone can turn out quite varying graduates - historians and literatures, 
sociologists and biologists. The time, and thus money, spent in satisfying requirements can 
be spent in quite different ways, since it is devoted to an intangible knowledge. So, to 
effectively control the market, one has to control what is taught; the intellectual content 
that is put into the program of study. Here the content of the Langdellian theory of law had 
a direct use. 
Christopher Columbus Langdell, Annual Report on Law School, in ANNUAL REPORTS OF PRESIDENTAND TREASUREROF 
HARVARD COLLEGE1876-77, 82, 88-92. 
To speak of "needs" raises the ugly question of "functionalism". I use "needs" with a certain malice. I am tired 
of hearing functionalism dismissed as if it were somehow stupid to assert that the products of human activity 
such as law have or serve functions. While I can understand how one might be upset at the politics of the 
functionalists of the Post-World War II period, that upset is not an objection to functionalist explanations. A 
hammer and a crescent wrench may both be used to drive nails into wood. But a bit of work at the task is likely to 
demonstrate that one of these tools was designed to, is functional for the indicated task and I dare say that an 
anthropologist in 10,000 years will have little difficulty coming to the same conclusion. 
Now, of course, some products of human activity, like legal education or negligence, are substantially more 
complicated to dope out than hammers and crescent wrenches. Indeed, it may be said that such complex 
products have multiple functions. (Then again, so do tools. A crescent wrench may be used to drive nails and, as I 
just checked out, a claw hammer, thought not a ball peen hammer, to tighten bolts and nuts.) But that only 
implies that the task of understanding the function is more difficult for complex entities. 
There is the problem of necessary relationship, I suppose. To say, as I am saying above, that the structure of 
legal education had a function is not to say that only this structure could have served that function. State 
legislation directly limiting entry into the profession or areinvigorated bar coupled with stringent, essentially class 
biased apprenticeship requirements could have done as well. And understanding why one route rather than 
others was taken in a society often tells much about that society. (Here the legislative route was unavailable 
because the relatively less elite legislatures would not go along; they even were unwilling to go along with the 
lesser entry requirements sought by the law schools. The apprenticeship route was unavailable because the 
corporate bar simply had no time to train the myriad of apprentices it needed; its desire to support university 
based education was a recognition that it did not wish the task.) But the existence of hypothetical alternatives or 
even of similar societies where different alternatives were actually taken does not undermine an assertion about 
the function of a product of human activity, at least unless one is caught in the clutches of a rather virulent 
sociological or historical positivism. 
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There are many possible contents to the notion of what it is to be lawyer, all the way from 
simple scrivener to the public statesman of Ciceronian virtue. 
40 
Many of these notions have 
been trotted out from time to time. The Langdellian version, the lawyer as the expositor of 
legal principles collected and rationalized through the use of legal science, had many 
advantages. First, as a matter of pure social status it was far from unimportant to this 
nascent professional group, traditionally looked down upon as "failed" practitioners or 
"retired" judges, that its intellectual product mirrored the work of the judge. The claim to 
equal partnership in the work of the legal profession as a whole was often heard at this 
time and generally based on the unity of the work of the judge and the jurist.41 Second, it 
was surely important that the Langdellian vision was dominant, or more aptly gaining 
dominance, at the time. One did not have to blaze a path but rather only swell a parade. 
Third, the Langdellian vision was useful in the university. 
Useful how? During these years the American University, as we know it, was taking 
shape. 42 Specialized academic disciplines unknown to the New England college, such as 
psychology, economics or history, chemistry, physics, or biology, English, modern 
languages, or fine arts, were creating themselves.4 3 The process, known by the 
unilluminating, but nevertheless accurate, title "professionalization", was producing a 
balkanization of knowledge as each piece of the academy attempted to do what the 
lawyer's were attempting: carve out a piece of the academic turf that would allow that 
group exclusive control over the production of knowledge in that area. 44 Again, constrict 
supply to increase price. The law professors needed to create a market, not from scratch as 
did the sociologists, but in the sense of excluding other potential producers of the same 
good from doing so. So in terms of exclusive control, the academic lawyers faced the same 
problem as all other nascent disciplines. 
Here, in terms of establishing exclusive control, iswhere the various notions of what it isto 
be a lawyer made some difference. The notion of the lawyer as scrivener really cut the 
academics out; teaching a handicraft was inappropriate to the university as Langdell 
himself noticed. At the same time too broad a role risked other intellectual poachers. 
40 See, supra, note 6, 82-87 gives content to the notion of the lawyers as the public statesman of Ciceronian 
virtue. 
41 See, supra, note 33, 321. 
42 See, generally, LAURENCEVEYSEY, EMERGENCE OFTHEAMERICAN UNIVERSITY(1965). 
43 See, supra, note 33, 313-14 for a rough description of the process and for sources on some of these disciplines. 
44 Id., 319-25. A similar, though by no means identical argument to what follows for the balance of this paper is 
Arthur Jacobson, Modern American Jurisprudence and the Problem of Power, 6 CARDOZo L.REV. 693 (1985). For its 
sheer elegance and the power of its categories, Jacobson's paper repays careful reading. At the same time, Iam 
not convinced that the process we both seek to describe isas exclusively intellectual as his paper implies nor do I 
think he would be convinced that the process isan heavily social as I think it is. 
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Ciceronian virtue suggested that rhetoric was a relevant skill, maybe moral philosophy; 
maker of public policy suggested that economics and political science might be central. 
However, Langdell's world of the private law litigator, his rules neatly ordered and logically 
defensible, suggested no other claimants. It was at once too technical for any other 
academic discipline to claim and simultaneously too general, indeed airy and theoretical, 
for any practicing lawyer to suggest as matter appropriate to an apprenticeship. As the 
content for a discipline it was a good match to the academics' need. And the rhetoric of 
legal science made it better still. Legal science was a method, or at least appeared to be 
one, and an identifiable method was the hallmark of any discipline in the academy.45 
Equally importantly it was a method so tedious and time consuming that the practicing bar 
could be expected to leave it to the academics and simply reap its fruits. Capitalizing on 
this division of intellectual labor seemed easy, especially since the rest of the university 
bore the same relationship to the law school as the society at large did to the legal 
profession. If legal science in its guise as the rule theory of law fit tolerably well with the 
rule of law ideology in the society at large then, though adopted for a different purpose, it 
nevertheless ought to fit well in the academy also. And so it did. 
Much of the intellectual product of these years before World War 1,for example, the great 
treatises, Wigmore on Evidence and Williston on Contracts, were the primary monuments 
to this ideal of legal science and thus a part of the creation of the identity of the law 
professors. But the production of the first generation of casebooks, most notable of which 
is, of course, Gray's six volumes on property,46 but also including such lesser lights as 
Bohlen's torts book 47 and Huffcut's Agency book, 48 was part of the same project. The 
casebook presented the law, the rules, scientifically. And not all of these attempts were 
successful either; Wigmore's torts book clearly got it wrong and was left by the wayside. 49 
Other activities contributed in a less direct way. Great gobs of print were spilled on 
standardization of courses, degrees and libraries.50 Efforts were made to increase the 
intellectual range of the professoriate through publication of materials on European legal 
45 See, supra, note 33; Schlegel (note 37) provides support for this proposition. As a brief supplement, I would 
suggest that the failure of political science and sociology to identify a method appropriate to the discipline 
accounts for much of the sense that neither is a discipline, as well as for the attraction of a general statistical, 
empirical method for both disciplines. 
46 JOHN GRAY, SELECTCASESAND OTHER AUTHORITIES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY (1988-92) 
47 FRANCISBOHLEN, CASESON THE LAW OF TORTS (1915) 
48 ERNESTHUFFCUT, CASESON THELAW OFAGENCY (1895) 
49 JOHN WIGMORE, SELECTCASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS WITH NOTESAND A SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES (1911-12). A study of 
why this book was rejected might well illuminate the contours of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
legal academic's intellectual world. 
5o See, supra, note 33, 321. 
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history and philosophy.5 Major theoretical attempts were offered by Thayer and later 
Ames to describe the nature of the work of the law professor. Thayer emphasized 
research, and gave scant attention to "the difficult main work of teaching'."52 Ames, six 
years later, put a greater emphasis on teaching young men how to "think like a lawyer".53 
Simultaneously much work was put directly into raising standards by increasing the 
number of years of pre-legal, and of legal, education, raising the minimum size of faculty, 
decreasing the maximum number of courses taught, and, of course, increasing the size of 
libraries.54 And much effort went into keeping the teaching of law the teaching of pure law, 
as is testified to by both the famous Beale/Ames correspondence with William Rainey 
Harper over the wish of Ernest Freund to inject such novelties as international law, 
administrative law, criminology, finance, railroad transportation, accounting and banking 
into the curriculum at the new University of Chicago Law School55 and the long fight at 
Columbia over that school's relationship with the School of Political Science.s5 
The more narrowly jurisprudential writings of the time were much of the same stripe. Here 
the best bridge into that literature is Wesley N. Hohfeld's, A Vital School of Jurisprudence 
and Law, the grandest plan for a law school ever concocted.57 Recognizing six varieties of 
jurisprudence - historical, comparative, analytic, teleological, legislative and empirical; 
several neglected aspects to the law students' education, including the required courses in 
legal history and jurisprudence and required reading in the history of the legal profession; 
and the need for a department devoted to the "civic and cultural study of legal institutions 
by non-professional college students",ss Hohfeld proposed nothing less than a temple to 
the law professoriate. Roscoe Pound's theory of interests is of much the same stripe. 9 
51 No adequate discussion of the impact, if any, of either the Continental Legal History Series or the Modern Legal 
Philosophy series is available, perhaps, because there was none. The latter is treated briefly in John Henry 
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFFALO 
LAW REVIEW(Buff. L. Rev.) 195, 202 n. 20. 
52 James Thayer, The Teaching of English Law at Universities, 9 HARV. L. REV. 169, 183 (1895) 
James Ames, The Vocation of the Law Professor, in J.AMES, LECTURES HISTORYON LEGAL 354 (1913); James Ames, 
Remarks, in PROCEEDINGSOF THE SEVENTHANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION OFAMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS16 (1907). The 
precise origin of the phrase "thinking like a lawyer" is unknown to me. 
54 See, supra, note 21, 92-103. 
Id., 39-40. 
Foundation for Research, in LEGALHISTORY, A HISTORY 85-89 (1955).OF THE SCHOOL OFLAW COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 
Wesley Hohfeld, A Vital School of Law and Jurisprudence: Have Universities Awakened to the Enlarged 
Opportunities and Responsibilities of the Present Day, in PROCEEDINGSOF THE FOURTEENTHANNUAL MEETING OF THE 
ASSOCIATION OFAMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS76 (1914). 
58 Id., 128. 
Pound's work, scattered throughout the pages of the law reviews, is collected in his multi-volume treatise, 
Jurisprudence (1959) which islargely a compendium of his original articles, complete with original footnotes, with 
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Pound argued that the point of law is to secure interests of people or groups or 
governments. Interests, that is "the claims or demands or desires for which or about which 
the law has to make some provision if civilization is to be maintained or furthered and 
society is not to be disrupted or dissolved", need to be first inventoried, generalized, and 
classified, then one has to "select and determine the interests which the law should 
recognize", fix their limits, "weight the means by which the law may secure interests", and 
"work out principles of valuation of interests".60 That is a mighty tall order. Indeed an 
heroic task fit for awhole generation of law professors. 
Pound's actual execution of the task is,however, instructive. Other than for some work on 
the means of securing interests, a subject curiously shifted to a negative - the limits of 
effective legal action - Pound stopped at classification, which is not to underestimate the 
compendiousness of that classification. Individual interests were divided into those of 
personality - the physical person, freedom of will, honor and reputation, privacy and 
sensibility, and belief and opinion; of domestic relations; and of substance - control of 
corporeal things, freedom of industry and contract, claims to promised advantage, claims 
to be secured against outsiders in economically advantageous relations with others, 
freedom of association and continuity of employment. Public interests, in comparison, 
were comparatively more limited, confined as they were to the interests of the state as a 
juristic person - again matters of personality and substance, and as a guardian of social 
interests. Social interests were, however, more elaborate - general security, security of 
social institutions, general morals, conservation of social resources, general progress and 
the individual life. 61 In contrast to this rather sloppy teleological jurisprudence, consider 
Hohfeld's more elegant, but no less grand, scheme of analytical jurisprudence. Hohfeld's 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions was nothing less than attempt to explain "all possible 
kinds of jural (i.e., legal or equitable) interests" as an "aid in the understanding and in the 
solution of practical, everyday problems of the law". 62 His efforts led to the production of 
two tables: 
only limited new material. His version of the theory of interests is contained in vol. 3 from pages 5-341. NATHAN 
ROSCOE (1959) 3, 5-341 (1959).POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 
6o Id., 16, 22. 
61 Id., 101-341. 
62 Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J.16, 20 
(1913) 
2011]1 American Legal Theory and American Legal Education 79 
and a surprising amount of technical commentary. 
The precise details of either system are less important than the overall activity. Both Pound 
and Hohfeld were busy doing legal science as Langdell, Thayer, and Ames had adjured 
them to do and in ways these elders would have understood. The object set out was to 
establish a discipline and then set to work in that discipline. But not just any discipline. The 
discipline of law, pure law. Thus, Hohfeld's work was in fact limited to "judicial reasoning", 
primarily in cases trusts and other equitable relations. And the grandest part of his vital 
school, the one devoted to jurisprudence, was in fact a school for training law professors; 
mere lawyers went to the school of law where torts, contracts and property were taught. 
Similarly, Pound's scheme is essentially one centered in common law. When he had to 
actually look at a legislatively created interest, for example, in "continuity of employment" 
under the Wagner Act, he was essentially unable to do so. 64 And likewise when he came to 
the point of having to value interests he could offer a notable caution, still lost on all today: 
one must be careful to compare interests "on the same plane. If we put one as an 
individual interest and the other as a social interest we may decide the question in 
advance in one very way of putting it".65 But, on the precisely relevant, indeed crucial, 
point of how to value interests once on the same plane he had to admit that the search for 
a method "is futile" and so lapsed into a jurisprudential schmorgasbord of alternative 
methods. 66 For both men, the system was grand, but it hid a rather narrow heart of 
common law adjudication. 
Of course today, Pound's willingness to recognize that legal method simpliciter was not 
determinative in valuing interests iswhat seems important, what makes him seem insome 
ways modern, just as his efforts at recognizing social interests and his early assertion that 
there were in fact causes in the law to the popular dissatisfaction with the administration 
of justice, that make him in political terms progressive. Similarly, Hohfeld's system surely 
helped lay bare the way that legal science inpractice manipulated its basic terms to come 
6 Id., 30. 
64 See, supra, note 59, 233-35. 
6 Id., 328. 
Id., 330. 
Nathan Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, in 29 
PROCEEDINGSOF THE AMERICAN BARASSOCIATION, 400 (1906). 
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out with desired results. 6 Yet, one would be mistaken if one were to over emphasize these 
matters. Both men are thoroughly locked in the world of Langdell's legal science and of the 
professionalization of the law professoriate. 
How deeply locked in that world both men were can be seen from Hohfeld's reaction to 
the work of a colleague and contemporary at Stanford, Joseph W. Bingham. In 1913, 
Bingham published a piece in the Michigan Law Review entitled "What is the Law?" In a 
major sense it is a piece straight out of analytic legal science, for Bingham's stated purpose 
as to "focus attention on each of several sorts of elements which exist in the field of legal 
study and their essential differences and correlations".69 And yet, as he set out on this 
work something strange emerged. "All the ambitious attempts to define this field agree 
that it consists of a system of rules and principles enforced by political authority. I believe 
that this idea is fundamentally erroneous and that it is a bar to a scientific understanding 
of our law".70 And what was this "scientific understanding" Bingham spoke about? It was 
not the "organized, generalized knowledge" of Langdell and his followers, but rather "the 
acquisition of an ability to predict that described efforts will or will not follow from definite 
concrete conditions and forces".71 And so viewed, law is "the concrete operations and 
effects", the "external sequences of phenomena" of "authoritative government" which by 
"observation, report, inductive and deductive reasoning and the other implements of 
scientific investigation, may be generalized into rules and principles". 72 And so Bingham 
proposed "a science of law" in place of legal science. In reviewing the piece, the editor of 
The Green Bag, a vaguely scholarly legal magazine, commented "Law isthus conceived of 
as something objective, as a certain aspect of human society in action, and the jurist's 
attitude toward his special field would not be unlike that of the biologist or naturalist".73 
He then observed "This interpretation does violence to the plain and natural meaning of 
words. By law we clearly mean ... not a real or imaginary state of fact, but a rule or 
principle ... Legal science isnot concerned with the delineation of external reality, but with 
an ideal material which offers a valuation rather than a description of human activity".74 Of 
this thoroughly traditional reply to an essentially revolutionary idea, Hohfeld wrote to this 
68 See, Joseph Singer, The Legal Rights Debate inAnalytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, Wisc. L.REV. 
975, 1050-59 (1982). 
6 Joseph Bingham, What is the Law?, 11 MICH. L. REV. 12 (1912) 
70Id., 3. 
71Id., 4. 
72 Id., 9. 
Jurisprudence Not an Objective Science, 25 The Green Bag 74 (1913) 
74 Id., 75. 
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friend Pound that the author in The Green Bag took Bingham's article "somewhat too 
seriously; but that in its general tendency, his criticism was correct".7s 
B.American Legal Realism 1920-1940 
Such a firm and direct reassertion of the traditional perspective is, of course, the hallmark 
of a confident orthodoxy. Yet, in less than fifteen years that orthodoxy would be shattered. 
All hell would break loose - its name American Legal Realism. What then was Realism? 
Viewed from the traditional perspective of intellectual history as collage, it was the casual, 
if not adventitious, gathering of ideas from Holmes - the prediction theory of law76, Gray -
the radical assertion that judges always made law7 ; Pound - the attack on mechanical 
jurisprudence and the program of sociological jurisprudence, the jurisprudence of 
intere sts, Hohfeld - the destruction of the logic of rights79 , and Bingham - the twentieth 
century notion of science as empiric not analytic activity8 o, and the forging of these ideas 
into a theory of judicial decision-making that emphasized the subjective element in the 
judicial process. This notion is not wrong, it just misses the point, as Hohfeld missed the 
point of Bingham's article. Realism's meaning isto be found in its social context. 
With the coming of the famous Root report of 1922, legitimating the night law schools on 
condition that their program be as long as that of the full-time day schools, and accepting 
the American Bar Association as the accrediting agency for all law schools, the position of 
the legal academic in the legal profession became firmly established.' If the battle for 
recognition had not been won unconditionally, at least it had not been lost. The American 
Bar Association would work to raise standards in a way that would benefit the academics. 
So much for institutional structures. On the intellectual side of law teaching, the great legal 
science project was completed. 82 The law had been given its initial correct formulation; 
7 Wesley N. Hohfeld to Roscoe Pound, Feb. 25, 1913, in ROSCOEPOUND PAPERS,Harvard Law School Archives, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 
7 Oliver Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897) 
7 JOHN GRAY, THE NATURE OFLAW (1909),AND SOURCES a proposition uttered for a thoroughly conservative purpose. 
78 Nathan Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908); Nathan Roscoe Pound, The Scope 
and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 598 (1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 515 (1912) 
7 See, text and supra, note 68. 
80 See, supra, text at notes 69-72. 
81 See, supra, note 26, 112-123. 
82 See, John Henry Schlegel, Searching for Archimedes - Legal Education, Legal Scholarship, and Liberal Ideology, 
34 J. LEGAL ED.103, 107 (1984). 
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what was left was to restate it. Beyond that devastatingly tedious, but clearly compelling 
project, all that was necessary was to monitor the slow changes in the corpus of law - a 
new wrinkle in consideration here, an extension of damage theory there. The prospect 
was, I suspect, a rewarding one to the people who had built the edifice, comforting to the 
normal scientists among the young, and thoroughly disconcerting to the more 
intellectually impatient of any age. Schools were prospering; faculties were slowly 
increasing in size, if only in response to demographic trends; and a certain post-war 
prosperity and optimism was fueling the dreamers in the academy. "Why dream?" one 
might ask. For years it had been drummed into the head of every young law professor that 
the proper home of a law school was in a university.83 By 1920 there were actually 
universities in virtually every Midwestern state, and some really large universities in the 
east. Demography had done for the university as a whole what it had done for the law 
schools. And so specialized knowledge abounded. That specialized knowledge was there 
for the taking, if only one knew what to do with it. 
For a young man of even a mildly left persuasion the "what to do with it" was obvious. This 
was a deeply conservative period in American history. The post-war red scare that led to 
the Palmer raids and the Sacco-Vanzetti case were all symptoms of an America that was 
fat, happy and wanted to be left alone. A reactionary Supreme Court, a war, and a 
modicum of formal success had sapped progressivism of much of its force. And yet, there 
were still radical alternatives available. Glowing reports still emanated from the great 
Soviet experiment; The Masses and similar journals were a notable literary force; and a 
real Socialist Party ran real candidates that got substantial votes. For liberals in a 
reactionary time, REFORM was the answer. Apply the knowledge of the university to the 
solution of social problems. 
The idea had been tried in La Follette's Wisconsin, with much noise, if not much success 
outside of agricultural technology. But, for law an impediment to reform was legal theory 
and, of course, the Supreme Court. Langdellian legal science, didn't really admit of reform. 
Oh, it was supposed to provide for change derived from the change in legal opinion based 
on changed social circumstances, but as Bob Gordon has argued there was a good deal of 
substantive bite to it as well. Legal science aimed "to make all (adult male) persons 
juristically equal, to recast all legal obligations so that they derived from an exercise of will, 
and to standardize the definition of rights and duties".84 This meant that all private law 
liability was to be derived not from status, but from contract seen as promise and from 
fault, both seen as objective, not private, manifestations of conduct.85 It also meant that all 
statutory enactments were "to provide a more efficient procedural mechanism for 
See, Schlegel, supra, note 51, 233-34. 
84 See, supra, note 6, 89. 
85 Id. 
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vindicating common law rights" or otherwise be seen as arbitrary, when not 
unconstitutional, elements of local law that kept the law from being a perfect system and 
were thus undesirable. 
If one wanted to attack this system one could of course attack the doctrinal pieces - formal 
equality, objective theory of contract and so on, as had been done by dissenting scholars 
since 1890. And such attacks were mounted, but to them were added a new, theoretical 
attack on legal science as Beale had described it. Starting with Bingham's attack on legal 
science for not being scientific, scholars attacked both aspects of the Langdellian solution 
to the problem of political legitimacy. The premises of law were sought to be shown to be 
not authoritative and the technique, not determinative. The materials used for this effort 
were commonplace enough - Dewey on science and scientific method 8, some Hohfeld, 
some Pound, a dollop of Freud 89 , a nod to Holmes and Corbin 9o and Cardozo9 l, all ripped 
out of context and used for purposes their authors would have disagreed with, but mostly 
it was home brew. 
Law was not rules; it was politics. As such it needed to be seen and taught in a way that 
presented the social issues directly. Thus, the old categories of contract, tort and the like 
ought to be dropped and in their place substituted "functional", i.e., showing the functions 
performed by the legal institution (all Realists were, at heart, functionalist anthropologists 
and institutional economists), categories, like risk bearing and business form and labor law 
or trade regulation9.92 Substantive reforms, largely legislative in nature, were to be pursued 
after applying truly scientific method to the study of social life and legal institutions. The 
problem of the automobile accident was to be solved much like workman's 
86 Id., 98. 
WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN ANDTHE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973); William Twining, Talk About Realism, 60 NEW 
YORK UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW(N.Y.U. L.Rev.) 329 (1985) attempts to develop the notion of a "dissenting tradition" in 
American jurisprudence, though in a thoroughly implicit fashion. Twining has used the phrase in conversation for 
years. He puts in the class of pre-Realist dissenters, Holmes, Gray, Corbin, Hohfeld, Pound and Cardozo. In 
addition to the works of these scholars noted above one needs to recognize BENJAMIN CARDOZo, THE NATUREOF THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS(1922); Arthur Corbin, The Law and the Judges, 3 Yale Review 234 (1914); Nathan Roscoe Pound, 
Liberty of Contract, 18 YALEL.J.462 (1909). 
John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L. Q. 17 (1924) is the usual cite. In fact Dewey's ideas on 
science were scattered all over until consolidated in JOHN DEWEY,LOGIC(1938) 
Here, I speak of Jerome Frank's attachment to Freud's theory of the unconscious that permeates JEROMEFRANK, 
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) 
9o Corbin, supra, note 87 
91CARDOZO, supra, note 87 
92 See, Schlegel, supra, note 51, 208-09. 
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93 94compensation, that of improvident credit by tighter bankruptcy law. In general, law was 
to be transformed from its role in specifying "combat zones of free conduct in which 
individuals might do as they willed without fear of legal reprisal" 95 to that of a positive 
agency of social control.96 
While all of this was going on at the intellectual level, in the law school's themselves there 
was just as much ferment.97 Among the less elite schools there was, of course, the great 
and continuing pressure of rising standards, tempered eventually by the monetary 
pressures associated with the Great Depression. More pre-legal education, more books, 
more teachers all were the talk of the times. At the more elite schools, other than Harvard, 
where for a while Pound dealt ruthlessly with innovation,98 the first visible crack in the 
teaching orthodoxy of large class, Socratic dialog came with the introduction of seminars 
into the curriculum, first for graduate and honors students, then for all students. Selective 
admissions, too, had its first highly tentative go-round, a real break from the tradition of 
admitting all who could pay and then flunking out a third. Columbia tried a wholesale 
curriculum revision designed to switch from assuming or ignoring knowledge of, to 
explicitly presenting, the "nonlegal social structure"; to shift focus from appellate opinions; 
and to focus on statutory law. And actual empirical research got carried by law professors 
working in law schools.99 Equally important, the first total, sustained criticism of academic 
legal education by an insider since Langdell's revolution was penned: Llewellyn's On What's 
Wrong with So-Called Legal Education.' 00 He found it "inept, factory-ridden, wasteful, 
defective, and empty" since "not rules, but doing, is what we seek to train men for" and 
the doing had changed radically from the "blurred composite photograph of the country-
plus-city lawyer of about 1870" that was in the mind of "the great case-book pioneers".101 
It would be a mistake even to suggest that the Realist's critique, for that is what it was, and 
educational reforms, limited as they were, escaped criticism or triumphed over night. In 
time, seminars spread everywhere, as did selective admissions, but at least in the first year 
See, John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 
BUFF.L.REV.459 (1979), 532-38 
94 Id., 522-32, 541-42. 
See, supra, note 6, 88. 
Id., 94-96. 
Much of what follows in this paragraph summarizes R.Stevens, supra, note 26, at 172-199. 
Id., 136-37. 
See, Schlegel (notes 51 and 93). 
100Karl Llewellyn, On What is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COL.L.REV.65 (1935) 
101Id., 653. 
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program and for much of the balance, at the end of the Realist challenge the curriculum 
largely still fit in Langdell's categories - tort, contract, property, crime, corporations and so 
on. Empirical legal research inside the law school died out for years and social fact seldom 
made it into the law school in any systematic way. And yet it would be wrong to see that 
Realism had little impact on legal education. For Realism killed Langdellian legal science. 
Although, just as Realism burst on the scene, the American Law Institute's great 
Restatement project, the crown of legal science, got underway,102 the Restatements have 
tuned out to be more of a tombstone for legal science, than a capstone. From the 
beginning, Realism's critics understood the threat. Two examples should suffice. In 1928, at 
an A.A.L.S. symposium on "Modern Movements in Legal Education", Joseph Beale, 
speaking "for the old men", noted that, "I look back on my work, and Iam not dissatisfied 
with it".103 He then opined, "Now, there is teaching of law, and there is teaching of other 
sciences. We thought that, in order to teach a class of students to become useful members 
of the bar, we should not teach them things; we should teach them to be something. In 
other words, the object of our endeavors was not to make them think what law is about, 
but to make them think like lawyers".104 Realism proposed to teach students to think what 
law was about, to adopt the outside, external, objective perspective, treating law as "a 
certain aspect of human society in action".105 As such, as Beale understood, Realism 
doomed legal science. As a viable intellectual force it was finished if Realism was put into 
practice. 
A more comprehensive criticism seven years later by Herman Kantorowicz, a refugee from 
Nazi terror, is equally poignant in its explicit defense of legal science. o0 Kantorowicz 
argued of Realism that , "[t]he substantive theory is that the law is not a body of rules but 
of facts; the formal theory, that legal science is not a rational but an empirical science". 10 7 
And then observed not that "these theories are simply untrue", but they are 
"exaggerations of the truth". 108 Most importantly, these are "doctrines which threaten the 
quiet progress of science".109 How can this be true? Curiously, Kantorowicz never says, but 
102 See, supra, note 82, 107; Schlegel, supra, note 51, 234. 
103Joseph Beale, Discussion, in HANDBOOK AND PROCEEDINGSOF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION 
OFAMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS53 (1928) 
104 Id. 
105See, supra, note 73, 74. 




86 German Law Journal [Vol. 12 No. 01 
his argument, really a nice compendium of arguments against Realism generally, boils 
down to this. Law cannot be facts because then we would have to teach facts not rules in 
law school, study facts as the science of law, and be unable to distinguish fact from law for 
purposes of charging ajury or limiting appellate jurisdiction. Similarly legal science cannot 
be empirical because if it were, judges could never decide new cases for there would be no 
experience to guide him, new statutes could not be interpreted and clear rules such as 
"the rule of the Constitution that the President must be 35 years of age could not be law, 
and it would, therefore, not be unconstitutional to make Colonel Lindbergh President".110 
The reductio ad absurdum, recognized by the author as such, conceals an important point. 
From an internal perspective, from that of the judge or jurist, though not necessarily the 
lawyer, the external, critical perspective made no sense. To look at the rule of law, at the 
rule theory of law, as a fact and not as a norm was to break its power. To do so sundered 
the unity between the work of the judge and the jurist, a unity that was part of the 
attraction to legal science for the academic lawyer, and, equally importantly, part of his 
claim to a special role as the expositor of legal science, as a German legal academic, even 
of the party of the left, could quite readily see. It was, in fact, not just the end of that claim, 
but the more importantly of the coherent professional identity carefully forged but a 
generation before. That would not do. That threatened the quiet progress of science. 
What then of Realism? If it was so potent a critique as to demolish the whole idea of legal 
science, why is it passe ? Why write of it as history rather than as current events? Well 
there are the usual reasons, the conscription of many of its partisans into the 
administrative and judicial apparatus of the New Deal, the death of others and the 
continuing economic contraction of the Depression that cut budgets for research and 
teaching innovation. More important, however, is a factor Kantorowicz wryly alludes to 
when he speaks of the potential for cooperation between American and German jurists as 
a result of "present events in Germany, like the even more memorable accomplishments of 
the Turks in 1453" (the fall of Constantinople)."' 
The rise of Fascism in Europe was paradoxically the fall of Realism in America. Criticisms of 
Realism for its interest in the "is", in the outside, empiricist understanding of the law, 
rather than the "ought", the insider perspective of legal science, led to claims that Realism 
was a positivism in which whatever was the law was acceptable law.112 Put to one side the 
obvious objection that the entire point to the empiricist thrust of Realism was to 
110Id., 1251. 
ill Id., 1253. 
112 EDWARD PURCELL,THE CRISIS IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFICNATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OFVALUE (1973) lays out 
the entire literature which ranges from the serious and sensible, LON FULLER,LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF(1940), to the 
silly and offensive Philip Mechem, The Jurisprudence of Despair, 21 IOWA L.REV. 669 (1936). 
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understand how the law was in fact working in order to provide a secure basis for criticism 
and, ultimately, reform; put to one side the objection that legal science had, in fact, been 
more supportive of existing law and that it relied primarily on a relatively weak and limited 
tool for criticism and reform - logic. The anti-Realist criticism was made in law, as in other 
fields, and in the face of a thoroughly positivist and increasingly obviously evil regime in 
Germany and of the revelations about Stalinist repression in Russia that tainted all left 
politics in a way that even the Spanish Civil War could not redeem, the criticism stuck. 
Llewellyn and others began back tracking, began turning to safer projects like contracts 
and the commercial code; the Catholic law school right wing began to be heard; and then, 
all at once, everything was over as America dived into World War II. 
C.Post War Developments 1945-1965 
During the War, the law schools virtually shut down. Many schools enrolled no more 
than half a dozen students in a class. Many small private schools, largely ones with 
unaccredited part-time programs, closed, never to reopen. When the war was over, the 
surviving schools were flooded with students, most all of whom were entitled to G.I. Bill 
educational assistance. The accredited law schools, particularly the state schools, took this 
occasion to rise to their patriotic duty, even to the extent of expanding enrollments above 
pre-war levels and of offering year round, no summer vacation, two year programs so that 
"the boys" could "catch up". No sooner had this influx of students begun to wind down, 
when the onset of the Korean War guaranteed the continued existence of G.I. Bill students 
and funds. The result was that by increasing enrollment and using a government subsidy to 
reduce cost, the elite and not so elite accredited law schools both paid for the costs of 
higher standards - four years of college was now the universal norm, larger faculties and 
libraries an affordable fixture - and simultaneously kept most of the closed law schools 
from reopening and drove most of the remaining unaccredited schools out of business. In 
almost all cases state legislation ratified these events. By 1950 potential law students were 
faced with a clearly socially stratified ladder of options for law school with the bottom rung 
the few remaining part-time night programs, followed by the joint night and day programs, 
then the weaker, exclusively day, state and private programs that graded imperceptibly 
into the most elite of such programs, all private schools - Harvard, Yale and Columbia. And, 
whatever the choice available to him, the student was served up pretty much an identical 
curriculum, centered on the great, private common law subjects that had made up the 
curriculum before the World War 1. 
Had nothing changed? Well, the practice of law had changed and changed significantly 
with the late New Deal and immediate post-war growth of the statutory specialties - labor, 
securities, taxation, anti-trust, trade regulation, and general regulatory practices. The 
u1All of this paragraph and much of the next are derived from R.Stevens, see, supra, note 26, 205-231. 
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upper-division curriculum reflected this change somewhat, as did the more occasional 
appearance of other basics like corporate finance, estate planning and zoning and of 
esoteric seminars like communication law. And, in the old common law courses, if one 
listened closely, one heard a new language spoken. Legal rules, still the staple of classroom 
discussion, were no longer justified on the grounds of their logical relationship with other 
rules or principles. Yes, that hierarchical system of justification was gone. Instead, what 
one heard in classrooms was talk about the policy behind the rules, each rule taken on its 
own. It was as if, in Duncan Kennedy's words, "the temple had been torn down and in its 
place was put a well manicured lawn. All rules were equal and all were one inch high".114 
How this had happened, how a bastard form of sociological jurisprudence triumphed, is a 
still obscure story, but the central clue, I wish to suggest, can be found in the failure of a 
coherent program for reform put forth in an often cited (but surely largely unread for it is 
largely unreadable), article published by Harold Lasswell, a famous political scientist, and 
Myres McDougal, an early defender of Realism, but of a younger generation: Legal 
Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest.115 The point of the 
article was to lay out a plan for "refashioning ancient educational practices to serve 
insistent contemporary needs", work to be done immediately so as to be in place when the 
war was over. With an explicit desire to clarify "fundamental issues", the authors 
asserted directly, "the proper function of our law school is ... to contribute to the training 
of policy-makers for the ever more complete achievement of democratic values that 
constitute the professed ends of the American polity".117 And why was this so? 
"[D]emocratic values have been on the wane in recent years. The dominant trends of 
world politics have been away from the symbols and practices of a free society and toward 
the slogans, doctrines and structures of despotism".118 Lawyers could be blamed for this 
reversal of fortune because they are, "even when not ... a 'maker' of policy, the one 
indispensible adviser of every responsible policy-maker of our society".119 And the 
prescription for reform was nothing short of total. "[A]n adequate training must therefore 
include experiences that aid the developing lawyer to acquire certain skills of thought: goal 
thinking, trend-thinking and scientific thinking. The student needs to clarify his moral 
values ...; he needs to orient himself to past trends and future probabilities; finally, he 
114 Duncan disowns ever having said this. The attribution is nevertheless correct and stealing someone else's 
metaphor, even a disowned metaphor, is a high crime. 
us Harold Lasswell & Myres McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public 
Interest, 52 YALEL.J.205 (1943) 
116Id., 203. 
117Id., 206. 
118 Id., 207. 
119Id., 208. 
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needs to acquire the scientific knowledge and skills necessary to implement objectives 
within the context of contemporary trends".120 And to implement this objective, Laswell 
and McDougal proposed a complete curriculum reform away from the doctrinal 
organization and toward organization by focus on influential policy-makers, values and 
skills. 
The details of the scheme are essentially unimportant for present purposes. No law school 
has ever even proposed to adopt it. What isimportant to notice isthat an explicitly radical 
piece coming out of the Realist ethos at Yale chose to yoke Poundian sociological 
jurisprudence to Realist empiricism and cover the entire package with democratic values. 
As a paper strategy the idea was nothing short of genius. Reverse the association of 
Realism with despotism by explicitly embracing, indeed trumpeting, democratic values. 
Unfortunately, neither author had done their trend thinking carefully. What sold instead 
can be seen in a little piece by Barton Leach of Harvard, critical of McDougal's efforts in a 
property casebook, called Property Law in Two Packages.121 
Leach saw two objectives to legal education - to prepare lawyers "to assume direction of 
all phases of the areas of personal conflict inherent in a complex society and economy" and 
"to provide a very large proportion of national leadership at all levels of authority".122 With 
these suitably modest goals came a suitably modest assessment of the then current scene. 
"[T]here is no basis for claiming that legal education has failed and that practically anything 
would be better than what we have now. On the contrary it has been generally successful. 
Everything possible should be done to increase its effectiveness, but great care should be 
taken to assure that novel expedients supplement existing values and do not destroy 
them".123 Thus, in contrast to McDougal's attempt to get a first year student to make an 
"evaluation of our system of property on the basis of its attainment of sociological and 
political values", 124 Leach wished to "give the student a professional equipment which will 
enable him to perform the real-estate side of a general law practice". 1 25 The layout of the 
entire course proposed by Leach emphasized the doctrinal considerations to practice, 
stripped of their systematic attributes such as Beale would have found essential, and as for 
policy, it was relegated to an appropriately limited role. "If a member of the bar litigates 
the validity of a covenant or condition restricting the use of land without considering the 
consequences to the community of this type of restriction, he will be giving his client very 
120 Id., 212. 
121 Barton Leach, Property Law in Two Packages, 1J.LEGALED.28 (1948) 
122 Id., 29. 
123 Id., 30. 
124 Id., 38. 
125 Id., 41. 
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bad representation. On the other hand, if he draws a will for a Rockefeller ... while 
reflecting on the inequalities of the distribution of wealth, he isnot likely to do the best job 
of which he iscapable".126 
What Lasswell and McDougal failed to understand was that after the War and its 
dislocations, the trend was not in the direction of more leftish democracy, but in the 
direction of privatism, reestablishing nuclear families disrupted by war on new suburban 
lawns, reestablishing traditional understandings of the lawyer and his work (it was one 
must remember in the era of Norman Rockwell with his romantic lens soft focused on Mid-
America), and reestablishing traditional ideologies, purged of their foreign elements. It was 
a replay of the aftermath of World War 1, a deeply conservative reaction, and not the 
continuation of the Second New Deal. Law followed that line as well. The logical edifice 
was gone, but, where doctrine gave out, only the most ad hoc, lawyerly policy intervened 
... security of transactions, protection of the family, antagonism to welschers, 
compensation for losses ... the status quo writ in traditional lawyers' terms and writ small. 
Lasswell and McDougal may have better understood what was happening to legal practice 
than Leach, but Leach knew what would sell. Pound had been victorious, but only after 
having been stripped of even the mildly critical bite that he had begun with. 
The only significant attempt at theoretical understanding of law in these years was that 
produced by Lon Fullerl27 and Henry Hartl28. For both of these men the emphasis was on 
privateness, on the primacy of the private ordering of private matters and on the thus 
supplementary role of the State, primarily in aid of those private orderings. On the 
question of the justification of rules, an explicit, direct justification was never offered. In 
some ways that fact is curious for no one would claim that the question of democratic 
values was far from anyone's mind. Indeed, Fuller was obsessed with the question of how 
to distinguish a "free" from a "totalitarian" legal system. However, the answer given to the 
basic question of justification paralleled the answers given elsewhere. A decision was 
justified when made by the body traditionally appropriate to render such a decision using 
materials traditionally appropriate to the task by means of traditionally appropriate 
techniques. The high school civics notion of American government - the legislature makes 
the laws, the judiciary interprets them, and the executive enforces them - had triumphed. 
Of course, it was dressed up in many ways, most significantly with the notion that each of 
these institutions had specific, specialized institutional competencies that, if followed, 
would help assure a proper result. The judiciary, the critical piece in the system, had as its 
126 Id., 31. 
127 Here there is no great book. The best entr6 into the mass of writings are two essays: Kenneth Winston, 
Introduction, in THE PRINCIPLESOF SOCIALORDER: SELECTEDESSAYS OF LONL. FULLER(Kenneth Winston ed. 1981) and 
Peter Teachout, The Soul of the Fugue:An Essay on Reading Fuller, 70 MINN. L.REV. 1073 (1986). 
128 HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS,THE LEGALPROCESS:BASICPROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OFLAW (1958) 
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special competency the resolution of private disputes centered around "what happened" 
and made its necessary decisions filling in the interstices between existing norms by, as 
every student of spoiled cantaloupes knew,129 the careful examination of the available 
legal materials, traditionally conceived, extended in line with their purposes, traditionally 
understood, by means of the technique of "reasoned (i.e., purposeful) elaboration". 
Thinking like a lawyer had triumphed again. 
This school of thought, accurately dubbed the legal process school,1o thus came to assert 
that democratic values are to be found not in the actual outcomes of decisions, as the 
Realists had by their critique implicitly claimed and as Laswell and McDougal had directly 
stated, but in the process of democratic institutions behaving appropriately. All was for the 
best in this reasonably decent of all possible worlds, if the system was left to behave pretty 
much as it traditionally had done. And so, the twin problems of authoritative premises and 
determinate technique had been realigned so that process guaranteed both - working 
correctly the system provided the premises and was the technique. Process was thus much 
like legal science had been fifty years before when it provided both the premises and was 
the technique. 
D.Contemporary Chaos 1965-
In retrospect the sleight of hand was dazzling. Its purpose, beyond fitting with a dominant 
conservatism, is less obvious, so I wish to put that question off for a bit. What isobvious is 
that the trick was discovered quite quickly. Curiously, the important event took place at 
the height of the dominance of process thinking. The first Sputnik satellite convinced 
Americans that our educational system was sluggish or worse. In the name of an 
improvement in science and technology education, accelerated classes, tracking, advanced 
placement and other educational nostrums were foisted upon the post-war baby-boom 
generation and their war-time siblings. Debates about what the program did for science 
and technology remain, but for the law the program generated agreat number of students 
trained to question accustomed understandings of the society in their high school classes 
and in their college work in the humanities and social sciences. These were the flower 
children of Woodstock and HAIR. Social policies, brought to the fore in the Kennedy and 
early Johnson years, especially the civil rights struggles and the war on poverty, added to 
the questioning that was finally brought to a divisive head in the fight over continuing the 
Vietnam War. As in the case of each previous war, its termination brought a conservative 
drawing in that is in evidence yet today. 
129 The first problem in the Hart & Sacks material is"the Case of the Spoiled Cantaloupes". 
13o Bruce Ackerman, Law and the Modern Mind by Jerome Frank, 103 DAEDALUS119, 123 and see, supra, note 26. 
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In the law schools much the same pattern could be seen. The arrival of the baby boomers 
led to the establishment of more new law schools than at any time period since before 
World War 1. Even with the increase in law schools, however, the demographic pressure 
firmly turned the now ubiquitous LSAT into the major screening device for entry into the 
legal profession. Curiously the conjunction of the reinstitution of the draft for law students 
during the Vietnam War and the rising feminist movement brought large numbers of 
females into the pool of applicants for the first time; this addition to the pool succeeded in 
raising demographic pressure beyond what would otherwise have been expected and 
managed to prolong that pressure, indeed to mask its decline, until quite recently. The 
decline of the GI Bill as a financing device led to the creation of large pools of subsidized 
and unsubsidized government assembled funds that were used to finance the education of 
an increasing percentage of students, creating for the first time an entire class of students 
who left law school substantially in debt rather than simply penniless. The concomitant 
increase in the pressure to find well-paying jobs was understandable and luckily, through 
the early eighties, employment of lawyers was in fact growing as fast or faster than that 
pressure. Then, the conservative reaction among students set in as jobs became relatively 
scarce and employers exercised their penchant for wanting their legal education recreated 
in their employees. 
Inside the law schools chaos reigned, not the creative chaos of the so-called student 
revolution, though briefly, at some places, there was some of that, but intellectual chaos. 
Required courses decreased in numbers and, in the once sacred first year, in length. In 
their place electives and seminars of every kind, stripe and color bloomed, not that the 
students necessarily took them. Students seem, in fact, not to have used their electives to 
stray much beyond the former required curriculum, a fact that bothered many faculty.132 
Clinical studies appeared almost everywhere, fueled primarily with Ford Foundation 
money at the outset and then by student interest, initially in relevant learning, a code word 
for giving legal assistance to the poor, then later in the understandable hope on the part of 
those whose were not very good at law school's intellectual games that they might 
nevertheless be good at practice. No one knew exactly where clinic fit in to a legal 
education that for years had been clinical only in the most artificial sense. Skills training 
was proffered as a rationale, but that didn't work well in a world in which litigation, the 
staple of most clinical programs, was effectively a lost art form; the common alternative 
rationale - the union of theory and practice - was no better since the practices available in 
clinics had little to do with any of the law school's more prominent batches of theory or 
with the office practice most students would enter. Somehow the most plausible 
justification - a place for bored third year students to hang out - was undercut by the 
relatively high cost of such education. 
1 Again Isteal from R.Stevens, supra, note 26, at 232-63. 
132 DONALD JACKSON& E. GORDON GEE,BREADAND BUTTER:ELECTIVESIN AMERICAN LEGALEDUCATION(1975). 
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Intellectually chaos reigned too. Legal Process was put to sleep in the sixties and early 
seventies when it became clear that as a jurisprudence, it could neither explain Brown v. 
Board of Education, the most obviously correct major decision by the Supreme Court of the 
Twentieth century, nor support the Warren Court's rulings in the areas of criminal 
procedure and legislative apportionment. Nothing, however, came to replace legal process 
in the classroom, beyond the soft, warm, but thin blanket that was policy analysis. And 
even policy analysis came under fire as both left in the form of the Critical Legal Studies 
movement, and right, in the form of the Law and Economics movement, tried some serious 
policy analysis from well articulated premises which showed that the standard issue variety 
was shoddy at best. 
At a higher level of intellectual activity, matters may even have been worse. For the first 
time a significant portion of the intellectual elite among law professors actually possessed 
more than a nodding acquaintance with a discipline other than law. At one level, the result 
was the proliferation of a specialized journals like the Journal of Law and Economics and 
the Law and Society Review. At another level, it meant that the regular law reviews were 
filled with material that much of the academic profession and most of the practicing 
profession found increasingly unintelligible. For narrow sub-disciplines - history, sociology 
and economics come readily to mind - the result was a veritable explosion of literature. 
But even here there were problems. The economists increasingly produced right and 
liberal versions of the same material and the historians, liberal and left versions, thus only 
adding to the cacophony. And, at the level of grand intellectual achievements, many trees 
were felled to make much paper but just listing the authors (alphabetically to avoid some 
affront) Ackerman, Dworkin, Ely, Posner, Rawls, Tribe and Unger, makes it clear that there 
is no dominant school of legal theory in the late twentieth century anymore than there is a 
dominant idea beyond the chaos elsewhere in the law school. 
E.Chaos Explained 
Why isthat so? To answer that question, Iwish to go back to where I left off a bit ago, to 
the question as to what exactly was the purpose for the intellectual juggling that was Fuller 
and Hart. 
Politics can explain much about law; after all LAW IS POLITICS as I have said, somewhat 
aphoristically, before. 133 The intellectual conservatism of Fuller and Hart mirrored the 
political conservatism of the late forties and fifties. So too the total political fragmentation 
of the seventies and eighties is mirrored in the law schools. But politics cannot explain 
everything. Look at Lasswell and McDougal for example. It is by no means obvious to me 
133 John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference on 
Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L.REV.391, 411 (1984). 
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that their scheme of democratic values cannot be turned to quite conservative purposes. 
Indeed, it is notable that on the one key political issue of the fifties, - McCarthyite anti-
communism - the more obviously conservative Harvard types compiled a far better record 
than their ostensibly more liberal brethren at Yale where individuals deemed to be too left 
were simply denied tenure. 134 Yet, Harvard style legal process caught on. To understand 
why that was so, I think that one has only to look at the two visions of legal education and 
ask, "Who can teach the stuff?" 
Harvard's version could be taught only by lawyers; Yale's was more ambiguous. In fact, it 
was taught only by lawyers; in theory sociologists might have done as well, economists 
could have surely helped, as could have social psychologists. That was Realism's problem 
as well. The facts about law and legal institutions need not have been gathered by lawyers. 
Indeed, they might well better have been gathered by others. But what then of the law 
professor; what of his professional identity, his place in the division of labor? Fuller and 
Hart answered that question quite easily. The law professor was a specialist in 
understanding legal process, in legal procedure. Just like Langdell's private law curriculum, 
no one else in the academy knew anything about technical legal procedure nor did they 
want to learn. The law professor's professional identity, so patiently forged before World 
War 1,was safe, and so the law professors quite easily preferred Leach's road. 
Of course, Realism destroyed that identity once before by blasting law out of its doctrinal 
box. That is why it was so threatening, why Pound reacted so strongly to "some of our 
younger teachers of law".135 Like Wittgenstein's hypothetical parent for whom shooting 
craps was not playing a game, denying the centrality of the rules was not what sociological 
jurisprudence was all about; it was simply a new way of justifying the rules. And ultimately, 
it was Realism that destroyed Legal Process jurisprudence as well. The move, in the now 
fashionable phrase, was simple to any Realist. Procedures are not neutral; any lawyer 
knows that. At best, they are tools that are used for substantive ends; at worst they are 
tools that by their very existence make certain substantive ends more likely, as modern 
pre-trial practice makes it more likely that wealthy parties will bleed poor parties through 
the cost of discovery. Process solved nothing. And ultimately it is Realism that can be 
blamed for the intellectual chaos of today. The cries of the old people about "lost 
standards" and the danger to a law school of "a professional faculty that has lost interest in 
most of the work of its alumni",136 show quite clearly the lack of any continuing 
professional identity to the law professor outside of the admittedly trivial one of being able 
to parse a case. 
134 See, LAURA KALMAN, LEGALREALISMAT YALE(1986). 
135 Nathan Roscoe Pound, The Callfor a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 706 (1931) 
136 Paul Carrington, The Dangers of the Graduate School Model, 36 J. LEGAL ED.11, 12 (1986) 
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Now, of course, one can trace the malady back to Ames' action in giving up the teaching of 
substantive law as the object of law school and substituting therefore "thinking like a 
lawyer". But in truth the substitution was a phoney one. Law School didn't teach its 
students to think like lawyers. Lawyers don't think like that. They think in quite concrete, 
instrumental terms. Law school taught students doctrine pure and simple and incidentally, 
but only incidentally, how it got manipulated. It taught law from the inside. Realism moved 
outside the box of doctrine and looked in; at that moment it broke open the academic 
lawyer's identity. 
F.Reflection 
One of the funniest things Bob Gordon ever said was at a New Year's Eve Party on 31 
December 1975 when with the stroke of twelve, in mock sadness, he sighed, "Ah, Schlegel 
Le fin du siecle!" The professional legal academic in the Langdellian mode is approaching 
one hundred years old. He, now finally he and sometimes she, is a creature of the first fin 
du siecle. That was a time like the present when political life was hardly secure and 
orderly. Indeed, there were real socialists in the woods then, real anarchists, real trade 
unionists. It was order that was being searched for in those days as Robert Wiebe so aptly 
noticed. 137 One of those pieces of order that emerged was law and professors. Is similar 
order likely to emerge again from this in many ways less conflicted political climate or has 
Realism killed that possibility? In a world where there are semioticians to explain about 
language and economists to explain about markets, psychologists and sociologists to 
explain about people and political scientists to explain about government, philosophers to 
explain about theory and anthropologists to explain about culture, and lawyers, real 
practicing lawyers, to give real apprenticeship training is there any need for law 
professors? I do not propose to answer that question but only to note that its answer, 
which will come in time, will help answer the more basic question, "What was Realism?" 
Realism, that quintessentially professorial movement, created the problem for its own 
class, which I have explored in order to help bring you to an understanding of itself. A 
snake swallowing its tail? Perhaps. 
13 ROBERTWIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER (1967) 
